**« The social relevance of explicit meta cognition for action and perception »**  
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 If metacognitive representations are defined as representations of the properties of cognitive processes, then we should distinguish between implicit and explicit metacognition. At the sub-personal (implicit) level, behaviour is affected by many metacognitive properties, such as precision of sensory signals, without awareness. However, some of these properties become available at the personal (explicit) level. Examples include, perceptual fluency, action selection fluency, and mental effort. These are properties of cognitive processes that are experienced subjectively and can be reported to others.   
  
There is, however, considerable leeway in how we report and interpret these experiences. Our behavioural response to metacognitive signals depends upon how we interpret them and this interpretation can be influenced by others and by our cultural environment more generally. For example, we use our experience of action to justify our behaviour and learn to feel responsibility and regret. We can also translate our sensory experience into reports of confidence that can create advantages either for the group or for the individual. Rather than being a problem the malleability of our explicit metacognition has a critical role in enabling sharing of subjective experience and in development of cultural norms.